Ideas, interests and institutions; explaining Irish social security policy by Murphy, Mary
 
 
Ideas, interests and institutions; 
explaining Irish social security policy 
 
 
 
Mary Murphy 
Department of Sociology 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Working Paper 08/08  
 
ISBN: 978-1-905485-70-3 
 
September 2008
Ideas, interests and institutions; explaining Irish social security policy                 Mary Murphy  
Acknowledgments 
 
This paper is based my doctoral thesis, ‘Domestic Constraints on 
Globalisation: A Case study of Irish Social Security Policy 1986–2006’, 
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, 2006.  
I would like to acknowledge that Combat Poverty Agency funded my doctoral 
study from 2002–2005. My thanks to the various people who allowed me 
interview them for this thesis. Thanks also to colleagues in DCU for their 
support and in particular to the late Dr Peter Fitzgerald for his friendship and 
good humour. I would like to acknowledge and place on record my gratitude 
to my PhD supervisor, Professor Peadar Kirby. Finally I want to thank 
Combat Poverty Agency for the financial support during the PhD and Combat 
Poverty Agency staff for their support and encouragement over the period of 
the PhD and in the preparation of this working paper. Mistakes, errors and 
conclusions are, of course, my own. 
 
 
 1
Ideas, interests and institutions; explaining Irish social security policy                 Mary Murphy  
Abstract: Ideas, interests and institutions; Explaining Irish 
social security policy  
  
We might expect that in such a small open economy as Ireland, the impact of 
global pressures on social policy would be relatively strong (McCoy, 2008). 
This paper tests such a thesis through a case study of Irish social security 
policy and argues that, over the period 1986–2006, Irish social security policy 
responded to global and domestic pressures in a particularly Irish fashion, 
qualitatively different to other liberal welfare regimes and to other small open 
European economies.  
 
In seeking to understand this puzzle the paper explores and analyses the 
social security policy institutions where social security policy is mediated. It 
outlines the Irish policy architecture – the political, institutional and ideational 
factors that shape the trajectory of Irish social security development. The 
paper identifies domestic constraints on globalisation and factors that 
influence the social construction of policy. It concludes by recommending 
changes in the policy process that might help lead to more equitable policy 
outcomes.  
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Glossary 
‘At risk of poverty’: a term used by the European Union to denote whether a household or 
individual earns below the 60 per cent of median income threshold 
 
Claimant: a person applying for a payment in his/her own right either for themselves or for 
themselves and child or adult dependants  
 
Consistent poverty: originally a measure of poverty of those who were ‘at risk of poverty’ 
and deprived of at least one out of the 8 items considered necessary to ensure a basic 
standard of living. Now a measure of poverty of those who are ‘at risk of poverty’ and 
deprived of at least two out of 11 items 
 
Contingency: a specific ‘state’ which a person must be able to prove in order to be eligible 
for payment, e.g. disability, illness, old age, unemployment  
 
Contribution record: record of amount of PRSI paid or credited to people during their 
working lives. 
 
Economic vulnerability: a measure of the economic situation of a household based on 
whether it is ‘at risk of poverty’, experiences enforced basic deprivation and has difficulty 
making ends meet 
 
Employment rate: the proportion of the working-age population that is working 
 
Equivalence scales: a set of scales used to measure household income and adjust it to 
take into account the greater needs of larger households 
 
EU-SILC: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; in Ireland an annual 
survey carried out by the Central Statistics Office since 2003 
 
Irish social welfare system: Irish system of income support administered by the 
Department of Social and Family Affairs (previously Department of Social, Community and 
Family Affairs; and before that, Department of Social Welfare) 
 
Labour force participation: a measure of the proportion of the working-age population that 
engages actively in the labour market, either by working or looking for work 
 
LIIS: Living in Ireland Survey, a household survey carried out by the Economic and Social 
Research Institute between 1994 and 2001  
 
Lone parent: a parent who has primary custody of a dependent child and is not living with 
the other parent 
 
Long-term unemployed: those who are measured as unemployed for a year or more 
 
Means test:  four specific tests for different categories of income – income from earnings 
(and income from spouse’s earnings); benefit and privilege (i.e. the value of living in the 
family home); savings and investments; rental income from property 
 
Median: the value that divides a sample in half, e.g. income level divided exactly in 
the middle of a scale of income from highest to lowest 
 
NAP/inclusion: two-year action plans that member states of the EU are required to draw up. 
Entitled Action Plan against Poverty and Social Exclusion (NAP/inclusion). The plans are 
part of an ongoing EU commitment to make a decisive impact on poverty and social 
exclusion by 2010 in each member state. Ireland’s current NAP/inclusion runs from 2006–
2008 
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Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC): provides an innovative instrument to support the 
member states in moving towards agreed EU objectives and to exchange best practice in the 
areas of employment, social protection and social inclusion. The OMC is a framework of 
political coordination without legal constraints. The definition of the appropriate means and 
ways to achieve the agreed objectives is left to the member states, respecting thus their 
competences in these fields 
 
Pay-related social insurance (PRSI) payments: insurance (usually a per cent of earnings) 
paid by employed people into a fund that then covers them should they be unable to work 
 
Quintile: one-fifth of a sample divided into five equal parts to show how income, for 
example, is spread throughout the population; each quintile represents where a person’s or 
household’s income is located 
 
Social assistance payments: payments that are means tested and funded totally by the 
Exchequer. To qualify, a person must prove a contingency and pass a means test 
 
Social welfare transfers: cash paid from various social welfare schemes to individuals or 
households 
 
Statement of Strategy: produced by each Department in accordance with the Public 
Service Management Act 1997. Includes key objectives, the strategies to achieve them and 
indicators of output and outcome against which performance will be assessed 
 
Supplementary welfare allowance: a means-tested safety net system for those who fall out 
of social insurance or assistance because they cannot prove any of the contingencies or 
because they have a specific need that cannot be met in the mainstream social welfare 
system  
 
Universal payments: a class of payments paid to everyone who passes a specific 
contingency; paid regardless of means and social insurance record 
 
‘Working poor’: A household below the ‘at risk of poverty’ threshold (e.g. 60 per cent of 
median equivalised income) even though some of its members are in paid work 
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1 Introduction 
 
Across the world social security systems are under pressure. Economic and 
political pressures associated with increased globalisation lead to new social 
vulnerabilities. Domestic trends such as ageing populations and changing 
household structures also create new social risks. The Globalisation Index 
(Kearney, 2003, 2004, 2005) ranked Ireland as one of the world’s most 
globalised countries. The impact of global pressures is stronger on small 
open economies like Ireland. Therefore we might expect globalisation to have 
a significant impact on Irish social policy.  
 
To test the impact globalisation may have had, this paper examines Irish 
social security change over the past two decades. It argues that, over the 
period 1986–2006, Irish social security policy responded to global and 
domestic pressures in a particularly Irish fashion, qualitatively different to 
other liberal welfare regimes and to other small open European economies. 
In seeking to understand this puzzle the paper explores and analyses the 
political culture and social security policy institutions where social security 
policy is mediated. The paper identifies domestic constraints on globalisation 
and factors that influence the social construction of policy. It concludes by 
recommending changes in the policy process that might help lead to more 
equitable policy outcomes.  
 
In trying to undertand the different paths that policy development can take the 
concept of path-dependency has some explanatory potential. Simply 
explained path dependence means that institutions are self-reinforcing, that 
policy, once developed in a particular direction, is locked into that policy 
choice and is difficult to change (Pierson, 1998). This means we can expect 
the original construction of Irish social security design as a liberal and male 
breadwinner welfare regime to determine some of the direction of future Irish 
social security reform. However, path dependency does not explain the 
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momentum or the distinctive style, pace and discourse of Irish reform or why 
Irish reform has diverged from those countries with which it had path 
dependency. Daly and Yeates (2003) reflect on the same question and offer 
‘policy architecture’ as a possible explanation. Hay (2004a) offers a three-
dimensional framework to understand the process of change as an 
interaction of ideas, institutions and actors.  
 
This paper explores the Irish policy architecture – the political, institutional 
and ideational factors that shape the trajectory of Irish social security 
development. Section Two briefly explores the competition-focused Irish 
model of development and summarises key social security trends of the past 
two decades. Section Three introduces the Irish political culture. This sets the 
scene for Section Four which analyses the policy institutions and processes 
in which some of key social security decisions were mediated and the power 
interests who mediated the policy. Section Five examines whether politics 
matters for Irish social security reform while Section Six discusses the 
political discourse and ideational debate that framed Irish social security 
policy. Section Seven brings together such institutions, actors and ideational 
influences and highlights how features of the Irish policy environment work to 
constrain policy. It mitigates threats of globalisation but constrains the 
possibility of equitable reforms. The paper concludes with recommendations 
for enhancing the policy community.  
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2  Trends in Irish social security policy  
 
Cerny et al (2005) characterise a competition state model as a state in which 
the actors – both politicians and bureaucrats – react to the pressures of the 
global market by promoting the competitive advantages of particular 
production and service sectors in a more open and integrated world 
economy. Kirby (2002) argues that it describes the nature and operation of 
an Irish state that prioritises goals of economic competitiveness over social 
cohesion and welfare. Dukelow (2004) and Murphy (2006) have stressed the 
Irish state’s selective interventionist role, enhancing economic 
competitiveness while failing to intervene and tackle high levels of income 
inequality and poverty. Boyle (2005) describes Ireland as an exemplar 
competition state where social policy is subordinated to the needs of the 
economy.  
 
This paper is concerned with what happens to social security policy in a 
competition state. How do the needs and power of capital drive social 
security policy?  
 
Figure 2.1 below summarises some of the anticipated social security policy 
changes of a competition state. The end outcome we might expect is for 
people to be more reliant on the market to realise their welfare and for 
welfare to be delivered using private market principles – for welfare to 
recommodify. The following discussion uses the framework in Figure 2.1 to 
trace the development of Irish social security reform over the past two 
decades.  
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Figure 2.1: Anticipated competition state policy changes 
Key trends  
Recommodification 
 
Anticipated competition state policy changes  
Regulation 
State as regulator, more focus on privatisation and 
managerialism  
Retrenchment   
Fiscal pressure – Cost cutting; Cost containment; Cost 
avoidance  
Residualisation 
More means-tested targeted payments; increased relative 
poverty; non labour-market participants are poorer 
Activation/ 
Conditionality 
Active spending, Conditionality, Activation of lone-parents 
and/or disability claimants   
Defamiliarisation 
Individualisation; Women’s access to education and training; 
Market provision of childcare   
 
2.1  A regulatory state? 
A regulatory or competition state ‘should provide a working framework of 
rules and performance indicators or targets for market actors to follow’ 
(Cerny et al, 2005:17). Historically, while Ireland has been a mixed economy 
welfare state, social security has been almost exclusively a statutory 
responsibility. Over the past two decades the state has made some attempts 
to divest itself of social security responsibility by affording greater opportunity 
to private market companies to deliver welfare policy including private 
pensions, health and disability insurance packages. Tax incentives mean 
citizens think differently about how to provide for key social policy needs.  
 
However, the state is also ambiguous about extending the role of the private 
market. It resists, for example, the EU procurement process that opens up 
the possibility of tendering out, to private and public bodies, the delivery of 
services previously monopolised by statutory bodies (e.g. contracts for social 
security postal delivery).  
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The state also attempted to divest itself of its traditional social protection role 
when it proposed to transfer disability protection to employers in both 1988 
and 1992. In contrast to the British experience (where there was a transfer of 
this function to private business), the Irish proposals were successfully 
vetoed by employers.  
 
The government invitation to the private pension industry to chair the 
National Pensions Board and a more business-led style of governance 
resulted in the commodification or privatisation of pensions. This was strongly 
advocated by the international financial services sector and resisted by civil 
servants; the international context was the World Bank’s promotion of a 
privatisation agenda in pension policy.  
 
Since 1991 the state promoted the social inclusion role of the non-profit 
private sector with the local Area-Based Partnerships. Since 1994, 
employment support functions including the Local Employment Service have 
been delegated to local non-statutory agencies. A 1999 White Paper 
promoted regulation of the community and voluntary sector. NESC (2005) 
and NESF (2006) signalled a shift to service contracts requiring a new model 
of governance where the role of the state moves away from the provision of 
services to ‘a regulator of rights and standards and enabler of local activist 
networks’ (NESC, 2005: 206-7). However, the scale and scope of 
transformative change has not reflected such ambitious rhetoric.  
 
Managerialism is evident in Irish social policy. Consumerism, choice and new 
public management discourse are evident in the Strategic Management 
Initiative and Public Services Management Act (1997), and initiatives like 
‘customer service plans’, ‘customer service targets’, and ‘service delivery 
models’ abound. A process of ‘expenditure reviews’, emphasising value for 
money, has had some impact on policy development. However, there is 
considerable resistance to new public management practices and institutional 
change in the Irish public service. While there is strong evidence of the state 
engaging in a new public management ethos of customer-focused delivery it 
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remains to be seen whether such engagement has fundamentally 
transformed staff and claimant experience of social security delivery and 
whether the state has the power to transform public service delivery (OECD, 
2008).  
 
2.2  Retrenchment 
In a competition state we expect a low-tax development model to necessitate 
budgetary constraint and cost containment measures. In the Irish context two 
factors are worth highlighting. One factor is path dependency. In a liberal 
residual welfare state with a high degree of reliance on means-tested 
payments, there is little room to reduce already ungenerous payments. The 
second factor is Ireland’s exceptional economic performance. Ireland’s high 
economic growth rates and limited pressures from an ageing population 
means that from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, Ireland not only suffered 
less fiscal pressure than did other OECD countries but, up to 2007, had 
budget surpluses and the capacity to expand social security rates and 
coverage.  
 
The period has been described as a ‘missed opportunity’ but can be more 
aptly termed ‘arrested development’ where government abstained from using 
the fruits of economic growth to expand and improve social protection to the 
degree that might have been anticipated in a period of economic growth 
(Alber and Standing, 2000:99). Despite globalisation offering the fiscal 
capacity to be truly transformative the Irish government chose to leave the 
social security system largely intact and unchanged (Cousins, 2005).   
 
Ireland experienced significant social insurance retrenchment in the 20 years, 
1986 -2006 but less retrenchment of social assistance payments. Two sets of 
social security cuts, the 1992 ‘Dirty Dozen’ and the 2003 ‘Savage Sixteen’, 
while short-term responses to periods of particularly tight fiscal austerity,1 
effectively retrenched social insurance benefits. The period cannot however 
be characterised as one of significant retrenchment or budgetary 
                                                 
1  1992 EMU preparations and the post 9/11 recession in 2002–2003) 
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transformation and real spending grew over the entire period. Less obvious 
long-term cost-containment policies have had a more serious impact on Irish 
society.  
 
The Department of Finance, with its concern for controlling expenditure, 
dominates the setting of social security rates. Proposals in 1998 for a 
pensions adequacy benchmark and in 2001 for an adequacy benchmark for 
the lowest social assistance payments were rejected by an advocacy 
coalition of the Department of Finance, employers’ representatives and the 
Department of Enterprise and Employment. The coalition was motivated by a 
combination of future cost containment, maintenance of work incentives and 
ensuring a level of flexibility considered essential to adapt to the global 
economy.  
 
More puzzling in the Irish case is the failure in the early 1990s to index 
earned income disregards. Freezing income disregards makes work 
incentive policy less effective and is inconsistent with a productivist-focused 
competition state. Such deviation is more likely explained by a cost-fixated 
Department of Finance dominating annual budget negotiations than by any 
developmental logic.2  
 
There has been significant ‘cost avoidance’ or resistance to accommodate 
new social risks through the social security system. The failure to 
accommodate gender-related reform is discussed later. Cost avoidance can 
also be seen in policy responses to inflows of asylum seekers and migrant 
workers. State policy is to exclude these needs from Irish social security. In 
1999 asylum seekers were restricted to ‘direct provision’ welfare entitlement. 
The May 2004 restriction of welfare entitlement to ‘habitual residents’ left 
migrants at the mercy of the market. As a result of direct lobbying from 
                                                 
2 Some cuts, such as the 1994 child-income support reforms which froze the monetary value 
of means-tested child-dependant allowances, do reflect policy restructuring motivated by 
work incentives rather than fiscal pressures (NESC, 2005: 52). These however required no 
fiscal investment.  
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international companies, legislation was introduced to exempt certain non-EU 
migrant workers from social insurance coverage. Social security policy is 
therefore actively responding to the needs and desires of international capital 
rather than to international labour.    
 
2.3  Residualisation? 
Competition state theory anticipates new forms of inequality and increased 
gaps between rich and poor; it expects those most distant from the labour 
market to suffer most poverty. Because ‘Ireland is exceptional within the EU 
for the high proportion of its social spending which is means tested’ there has 
been less shifting from universal to selective social security payments than 
one might otherwise expect in a competition state. NESC (2005) 
recommends that Ireland maintain this hybrid model and reliance on means-
tested payments. Despite employment growth and decreases in 
unemployment, levels of dependency on social welfare among the working 
aged remain stubbornly high. High dependency on means-tested payments 
might not matter if payments were adequate. However, Irish policy has 
always stressed work incentives and low replacement rates. These rates, 
which have been characterised by a minimal subsistence type of support, 
have in fact further declined relative to average net earnings. 
 
Despite assertions to the contrary there is evidence of a widening of income 
inequality in Ireland over the course of the economic boom. Between 1994 
and 2005, the poorest 10 per cent’s share of national income decreased by 
0.6 per cent and the richest 10 per cent increased by 1.2 per cent. While in 
1994 15.6 per cent lived below the 60 per cent poverty line, by 2006 17 per 
cent lived below the same line. Using EU comparable data, 19 per cent of 
Irish people experience a risk of poverty compared to an EU average of 16 
per cent (CORI, 2008:27).  
 
Other measures of income inequality such as the S80/20 and the Gini 
coefficient remained stable over this period at 5 and .33 respectively. In 
Fahey et al (2007) Whelan and Layte argue that the Irish state ‘has not 
prioritised equity as an objective’ or made any  ‘concerted attempt to equalise 
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incomes through taxation and redistribution’. The political choice was to 
follow the central logic of a competition state and keep welfare relatively 
ungenerous in order to preserve work incentives.  
 
There has been a shift in the composition of groups experiencing relative 
poverty, those outside the labour market experience this higher risk of 
poverty. Unemployment, while still significant, is no longer the major risk 
factor; those at greatest risk – people with disabilities – found their rate 
increased by 24 per cent from 1994 to 2003; they remain with a 40.8 per cent 
risk in 2006 the second highest at-risk group; unemployed people are most 
vulnerable. The aged and people in home duties/lone parents saw their rate 
of poverty increase by 23 per cent and 16 per cent respectively over the 
same period. While generous pension provision over budgets 2005–2007 
brought older people’s poverty risk down to 14.8 per cent in 2006, the poverty 
risk for those in home duties remained high at 23.8 per cent in 2006. The 
trend is clear. Those relying primarily on social welfare, particularly those in 
receipt of working aged social assistance means-tested payments, are most 
likely to fall below poverty lines linked to average incomes.  
 
2.4  Activation/Conditionality?  
The traditional principle of designing social security to preserve work 
incentives is now underpinned by a new Irish focus on ‘performative 
inclusion’, which stresses employment as the best route out of poverty3 
(Dukelow, 2004). This section seeks to establish the particular style and 
scale of Irish commodification by reviewing three key trends: spending on 
active measures, changes in ‘conditionality’ and extension of activation 
beyond unemployed claimants. If Irish social policy rhetoric is translated into 
policy, it is here that we might expect to find significant transformation of 
social policy towards a more active policy that is consistent with the logic of a 
competition state.  
 
                                                 
3 In 2006 6.5 per cent of the working population (116,000 people) were at risk of poverty. 
This highlights the vulnerability of employment-focused anti-poverty strategies.   
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In the competition state we expect public investment to shift to active labour 
market spending. Significant active labour market expenditure is a long-
standing feature of the Irish welfare state and Irish spending on active labour 
market programmes increased from an already comparatively high 1.46 per 
cent of GDP in 1985 to 1.53 per cent of GDP in 2000 (a significant real 
spending increase), while over time programmes have become more 
progression oriented and linked to participation obligations.4 There is still 
scant evidence of the level of transformational institutional reform of either 
employment services or income support offices experienced across most 
OECD countries (Finn, 2000).  
 
Irish social security literature is ambiguous about whether Irish policy has 
moved towards more work obligations. McCashin (2004), Van Oorschot 
(2002), Boyle (2005), Ó Riain and O’Connell (2000), Daly and Yeates (2003), 
Martin and Grubb (2001) and Pearson (2003) all conclude that compulsion is 
remarkably absent in the Irish policy regime relative to more conditional 
practice in both liberal regimes and small open economies.  Taylor (2002) 
and Dukelow (2004) conclude that policy shows significant supportive and 
punitive changes which, combined, have pushed or pulled welfare claimants 
towards employment. This stronger style of commodification, ‘systematic 
engagement’, was introduced in the 1997 National Employment Action Plan 
(NEAP), a window of opportunity occasioned by the European Employment 
Strategy Open Method of Co-ordination.  
 
There remain institutional vetoes on a stronger model of conditionality which 
would transform work obligations to lone parents, spouses of male claimants, 
and people with disabilities. The Department of Social and Family Affairs 
(2000c) argues that reluctance to extend conditionality is due to the lack of a 
coherent childcare infrastructure and of services for people with disabilities. 
Procrastination may also be due to fear of a political backlash from those 
                                                 
4 Active labour market programmes, administered by a number of government departments, 
have been criticised for a lack of focus on progression to employment (Dukelow, 2004). 
Boyle (2005) explains this as an outcome of policy-makers, including backbench politicians, 
supporting the social-policy rather than the labour-market aspect of programmes. 
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who might conservatively respond to measures designed to deny women 
their ‘right’ to work in the home.  
 
2.5  Defamiliarisation?  
While not yet implemented, DSFA proposals in 2006 to extend work 
obligations to lone parents and dependent spouses could have potentially 
far-reaching implications in moving from a contingency-based social security 
system to a more productivist system where all working age social assistance 
recipients are required to have a ‘lifetime attachment to the labour force’. If 
achieved this reform would reflect a significant shift in policy consensus. 
However, despite significant rhetoric, by late 2008 there is still little evidence 
of political ambition for such reform.   
 
Likewise while the state partially individualised personal tax credits, despite 
some debate there has been little progress towards individualising working-
aged social security payments, and Irish social security remains a male 
breadwinner regime in a family-based, gender-differentiated social security 
system where women experience considerable obstacles to registering as 
unemployed or accessing labour market supports. Failure to develop a 
childcare infrastructure remains the biggest obstacle to increased 
employment participation for women. The state relies on market-led 
responses to childcare and limits eldercare responses to tax incentives to 
provide private nursing homes.  
 
Failure to individualise social security or to introduce child and elder care 
supports is paradoxical in a competition state aiming to increase the labour 
force participation of mothers. A neo-liberal fixation on limiting state 
intervention is a partial explanation but policy inaction or lack of 
transformation is not just about cost avoidance. Policy paralysis is due to 
politicians’ fears of introducing reforms in the absence of policy consensus 
and to the political difficulty of mediating between those advocating 
conflicting policy options. Policy is also limited by the strong veto power of 
employers who resist parental leave policies. The lack of policy to promote 
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women’s economic participation is also due to a deeply rooted ideological 
ambiguity about mothers’ labour-market participation in a conservative, 
patriarchal political culture (O’Connor and Murphy, 2008; O’Connor, 2008). 
Despite these obstacles women’s and especially mothers’ labour market 
participation has increased significantly in Ireland.  
 
Summarising the type of change observed under these five competition state 
indicators we see some evidence of movement from a redistributive welfare 
state to a productivist reordering of social policy to meet economic needs. 
However, given significant demand for Irish labour, there is less focus on 
welfare-to-work strategies than might have been expected. Specifically there 
has been little progress relating to women’s access to employment, less 
upgrading of income disregards and tackling of unemployment traps, less 
conditionality and less extension of conditionality to groups outside the formal 
live register, than one might expect. Sweeney and O’Donnell (2003:33) and 
Cousins (2005: 339) argue that Irish social security policy has not yet 
adapted to the needs of competitiveness. NESF (2000: 65), Loftus (2005) 
and NESF (2006) highlight the lack of a comprehensive welfare work 
strategy. Irish experience of reform, while broadly consistent with the above 
competition state indicators, is also less consistent with some key 
productivist expectations of a competition state.  
 
How can we explain why elements of Irish change contain features that are 
somewhat uncharacteristic of a competition state.? As suggested earlier, 
path dependence has some explanatory power. The high number of 
contingency payments inherited from the past makes restructuring quite 
complex, limits the scope and pace of social security reform options and 
enables those resisting reform to hide behind the complexity of the reform. 
Change is rendered less urgent because the Irish social security system is 
already ‘lean and mean’ and its employment orientation already broadly 
consistent with a liberal market economy. The benefits reaped from the 
global economy – high levels of job creation and related reductions in 
unemployment – rendered it less necessary to introduce harsher conditional 
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obligations on unemployed people and others. Path dependency alone 
cannot explain why Irish social security reform appears to have its own 
distinctive style, pace and discourse and in particular why it diverges from 
those countries with which it shared path dependency.  
 
Daly and Yeates (2003) discuss the same question and offer policy 
architecture as a possible explanation. The rest of this paper explores this 
policy architecture – the political, institutional and ideational factors that may 
have shaped the trajectory of Irish social security development.    
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3   Irish political culture  
 
Before examining specific aspects of the Irish social security policy 
community we first reflect on the wider political culture which influences the 
policy environment of every actor in the policy community. There is a lively 
literature contesting different understandings of the Irish state, its capacity, 
level of autonomy and model of development (Ó Riain and O’Connell, 2000;  
Allen, 2000; O'Hearn, 1998; Cousins, 1995 a, 2005; Kirby, 2002; Taylor, 
2005). While the literature reflects serious disagreement about the nature of 
the Irish state it also reflects consensus about key characteristics of the 
peculiar post-colonial institutions of the Irish state.  
 
Some of these characteristics are usefully described as ‘veto points’. Hay 
(2004a:205) differentiated states according to institutional characteristics like 
the type of electoral regimes and the number of ‘veto points’.  As Swank 
(2002:285) observed: 
 
Central features of domestic institutions shape … promote or impede configurations of 
norms, values and behaviours embodied in national policy-making routines that favour 
or disfavour slow adaptation to the pressures of globalisation and the inclusion of all 
interests in that process.  
 
For the status quo to change, a certain number of individual or collective 
decision-makers must agree to this change. A veto player can be understood 
as ‘an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy 
decision’ (Tsebelis,2000:209). Relative to other Anglo-Saxon regimes, 
Ireland has a higher and an increasing number of veto players.5  Combined 
with the conservative nature of the early Irish state which valued continuity of 
policy-making and rejected policy innovation (Lee, 1989; Acheson et al, 
2004; Ferriter, 2004; Kiam-Caudle, 1967), Irish veto players work to limit 
policy change. Lijphart mapped shifts in democratic styles in 26 states from 
1980 to 2000 and illustrated how Ireland moved from a (barely) majoritarian 
                                                 
5 Lijphart (1999) hypothesised that countries with coalition governments, bicameral 
legislatures, flexible constitutions, presidential institutions, corporate interest group 
mediation, federal or decentralised governance and PR-based electoral systems will have 
more veto players and as a result will experience more difficulty in achieving policy change.  
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style democracy to a consensus-oriented democracy.6 Multiple vetoes lead 
to policy cultures dominated by blame avoidance or policy avoidance (Hood
2002:16-20, Green-Petersen and Haverland, 2002:24; Pierson 1994, 1996) 
but also to a consensus culture and a more ‘kind and gentle’ policy 
predisposition (Lijhpart, 1999:301). However, the problem is that such 
institutions mitigate both negative and positive reform and produce a frozen 
landscape of policy reform.  
, 
                                                
 
Ireland is the only English-speaking country or liberal welfare regime that fits 
the ‘consensus’ typology. We can expect therefore that the politics of 
mediating welfare reform in Ireland will be different to that in other liberal 
welfare regimes. Ditch and Oldfield (1999) differentiated between ‘innovative’ 
and ‘consolidating’ regimes. While they did not include Ireland in their 
analysis the above discussion on veto points suggests Ireland is more likely 
to be ‘consolidating’ than ‘innovating’.    
 
How do institutional features of the Irish state impact on the style of policy 
mediation? It is striking, the degree to which one Irish institution, the 
Proportional Representation electoral system, dominates and influences the 
political culture and policy system. Lijphart (1999) distinguished between 
multi-member-district parliamentary systems with Proportional 
Representation (PR) and single member first-past-the-post plurality or 
majority voting systems.7 Cousins (2005:124), Stephens, Huber and Ray 
(1999) and Swank (2002) concur with Hay’s (2004a:205) comment that 
‘centralised adversarial first-past-the-post and two-party systems are more 
prone to crisis induced policy-making than others which are more prone to 
incremental reforms’.  
 
The PR electoral system is also more favourable to smaller parties and 
independents and reinforces the likelihood of coalition governments and a 
 
6 Ireland is characterised by Lijphart (1999: 67, 114–117, 189) as a unitary and centralised, 
two and half party, semi-presidential system with parliament and an elected president, a 
‘medium influencing’ Prime Minister and ‘weakish’ in relation to judicial review and 
constitutional rigidity. 
7 See Lijphard (1999;148) and Sinnott (2004) for a full explanation of PRSTV. 
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veto culture (Lijphart, 1999:150). Contending politicians, in order to attract as 
wide a range of transfers as possible, avoid controversy, ‘crowd the middle 
and cloud ideological differences’.8 Social security policy, given that its 
impacts are individually experienced, immediate and transparent, is 
particularly sensitive to PR and the emphasis on consensus in Irish political 
culture. Multi-seat constituencies lead to intra-party competition. Politicians, 
unable to differentiate themselves by way of party or policy, instead 
emphasise brokerage relations with the electorate. Such a political culture is 
‘localistic, clientalistic and intensely responsive’ (Boyle, 2005:22).  
 
This type of electoral system is sensitive to key groups who can swing votes 
including transfers towards or away from certain parties or candidates and it 
provides advantages for large interest groups representing sectoral or local 
interests.9  Groups with sufficient organisational capacity to swing their 
membership or public opinion receive disproportionately more attention from 
the political system. This leads to dysfunction in the policy system where 
policy decisions that are in the national interest may be vetoed by sectoral 
interests (de Buitléar et al, 1998; Barry, 2005:49). Sinnott’s 2007 study of the 
Irish voter affirms the impact of this institutional configuration on Irish policy 
discourse. In particular he argues that the emphasis on candidate-centred 
voting means an absence of ideological voting and a lack of linkage between 
elections and national policy. 
 
A highly centralised Irish executive cabinet dominates the houses of the 
Oireachtas – the Dáil and Seanad (Connolly, 2004:249). Such highly 
centralised governance should make it relatively easy for a political party with 
a parliamentary majority to implement significant welfare change (Cousins, 
2005:123). However, in the past two decades it has proven impossible for 
                                                 
8 In multi-seat constituencies governments are not decided until the last seat is determined. 
Last seats are often determined on transfers from the eighth or ninth count. In order to attract 
such late transfers parties need to attract transfers from voters who have given earlier votes 
to opposition parties. This orientates parties to play safe consensus politics that will not 
alienate potential transfers.  
9 Gillespie (2005) describes the Irish PR system as having ‘seismographic qualities which 
enable minor tremors in public opinion transfer into significant changes in parliamentary 
representation’. 
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one political party to achieve a parliamentary majority. Permanent coalition 
government, electoral uncertainty and short-term political tenure has 
reinforced short-term political decision-making where budget spending 
follows electoral cycles (Cousins, 2007). Parties manage or minimise 
potential policy conflict among coalition partners by using programme 
managers to gain early consensus of all party leaders involved in the 
government (Murray and Teahon, 1997:258; O’Halpin, 1993:8). Cousins 
(1995a, 2005) and Hardiman (1998) highlight the power of the bourgeois or 
middle class in determining the development of a tiered welfare state. 
McLaughlin (2002) notes the power of professional elites and Montague 
(2001), Lawless (2001), and O’Flynn (2001) note the veto power of the 
middle class exercised through the media.  
 
The Irish social partnership process and individual Irish social partners have 
evolved as strong veto players (Hardiman, 2000; NESC, 2005). Likewise the 
civil service composition of social partners is male, white and middle class. 
The state also remains patriarchal. Women (and other groups experiencing 
inequality) are underrepresented in all aspects of decision-making (O’Connor 
and Murphy, 2008; O’Connor, 2008).  
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4  The policy community: domestic and international 
bureaucrats    
Policy is understood as ‘an intended course of action or the rationale or 
decision to adopt, or not to adopt, an option from competing courses of 
action’ (Parsons, 1995:14). Public policy study is concerned with how issues 
and problems come to be defined and constructed and how they appear on 
the public agenda (ibid:xv). It does this by analysing interaction in the ‘policy 
community’ where actors and institutions with a common policy focus use a 
shared language to discuss and bargain about policy ideas (Sabitier,1999).  
 
Policy science literature warns against attempts to analyse too much order in 
chaotic policy processes where each process is unique and complex (Burton, 
2001; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). It is helpful nonetheless to disaggregate 
policy processes into three discrete independent variables: ‘interests’, 
‘institutions’ and ‘ideas’. These variables determine the pace and direction of 
policy change in any policy community (Hay, 2004a:204). Hay (2004b:246) 
stresses how ‘policy-making, even in response to common external 
challenges, is a highly complex and differentiated process’. This process is 
made even more complex by the transformational influence of globalisation 
on governance.  
 
Cerny (2002a) used the imagery of a policy community transforming from a 
traditional ‘iron triangle’ to a ‘golden pentagon’. The iron triangle is used to 
describe a domestic policy community with three traditional points of power 
(bureaucrats, politicians and non-statutory actors). The golden pentagon 
imagery suggests a transformation to a more complex and fragmented policy 
community with two additional points of power (multilevel governance and 
transnational policy elites). This imagery (depicted below) provides a way to 
map the Irish social security policy community, a pre-requisite to 
understanding how policy is mediated.  
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Figure 4.1:  Irish social security community  
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The following cursory examination of the actors and interests within the social 
security policy community aims to develop an understanding of the dynamics 
and relationships in that policy community and whether these have changed 
over the past 20 years. This section analyses three points of the pentagon: 
bureaucrats, multilevel governance and the international policy elite. The 
following section analyses the remaining two points of the pentagon: the 
political community and other interests groups which are grouped under 
corporatist, pluralist and elitist headings.  
 
Most institutions, whether state or societal, work at national level,10 and are 
organisationally independent, stable and well resourced. There is overlap, 
dialogue and interaction between the institutions and interests. The 
community is relatively fluid. Policy agendas move across institutional 
spaces11 and membership of institutions changes over time.12 Brewer and de 
Leon (1983) stressed the importance of decision-makers’ subjective 
preferences. Senior membership of these spaces is primarily male, middle-
aged, third-level educated, home-owning and white. Mainly indigenous Irish, 
they share common Christian-based social and political values. Continuity 
and stability enables informal networking. While internationally Irish policy 
institutions such as NESC and ESRI are well regarded, in interviews with 
actors in the community there is a common self-diagnosis of an 
underdeveloped policy capacity and a weak policy learning capacity.  
 
Having discussed these general characteristics, discussion now turns to the 
five points of the golden pentagon. We first examine the bureaucrats and 
secondly the non-statutory actors (corporate social partnership, pluralist civil 
                                                 
10 Regional health board and social security structures and local office-level staff are not 
distinctly visible in the policy community. Community-based or work-based local level actors 
participate in policy debate through their own national organisations. Lack of direct local 
participation is seen as problematic and various institutions have initiated ways of opening 
up more sub-national input into the anti-poverty debate (NESF, 1997). 
11 The NAPS, for example, was initiated in the political system, driven by the civil service, 
supported by civil society, underpinned through Social Partnership and strengthened through 
interaction in the EU. 
12 Politicians are now members of the NESF, the CVP is now part of the NESC, and more 
groups attend the DSFA pre-budget forums.  
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society and power elites). We then move to examine whether there is 
evidence of either multilevel governance or an international policy elite before 
finally examining political actors and institutions. Given the constraint of 
space this is necessarily generalist and not inclusive of every aspect of this 
policy community. The period referred to covers 1986 to 2006 and only 
captures a broad sense of that time. 
 
4.1  Civil service  
The senior Irish civil service is characterised by its homogeneity. Catholic, 
middle-class, male, with a rural, educated background, civil servants are 
powerful and can and do veto policy agendas (Lukes, 2007). However, they 
now work in a more crowded and fragmented policy community and have to 
share space with social partnership. The typical Irish civil servant works in a 
conservative culture that has been slow to transform under the Strategic 
Management Initiative (NESC, 2003; Pollit, 2005). Policy change is 
dominated by slow, incremental, path-dependent administrative 
considerations (Crotty, 1998). This more complex and fragmented policy-
making process makes it difficult to move without consensus and leads to 
procrastination and policy paralysis or inertia (NESC 2006).  
 
The civil service is not a monolithic interest group. Departments compete with 
each other and the Department of Finance has effective veto power over 
other Departments. Policy capacity is often weak and, because government 
Departments have devolved policy functions to numerous statutory agencies, 
is increasingly fragmented (Clancy and Murphy, 2007; OECD, 2008). EMU 
convergence criteria have reinforced Department of Finance vetoes of public 
expenditure decisions, and access to Ministerial power is also more difficult 
in a more crowded policy community. 
 
Laffan and O’Donnell (1998:161) argue that Ireland’s lack of a national 
system of innovation was inimical to economic modernisation. NESC (2005, 
2006) makes the same case for social innovation. While all Departments 
have in common a weak policy capacity, they can still be differentiated by 
cultural and ideological differences. The structure of the Department of Social 
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and Family Affairs (DSFA) is heavily influenced by the priority it affords 
delivery. Preoccupied by administrative and delivery challenges, it is limited 
in its capacity to engage in policy-making. This is not a simple resource 
issue, rather the pressures of guaranteeing delivery of weekly social welfare 
payments has influenced the Department’s personality.13 Divided into 
operational and policy divisions (the brawn and the brains), the policy division 
(the Aireacht) is small and under-resourced but forward thinking, with bright 
and competent staff who have fostered good relationships within the policy 
community and engaged positively in social partnership.  
 
Over the past two decades the DSFA has established statutory 
organisations.14 While these agencies institutionally strengthen the 
Department’s policy capacity and all make contributions to policy debate, 
they also signal overlap and duplication and are an indicator of the 
complexity and fragmentation of the policy community. Most recently the 
Office for Social Inclusion was established to support engagement with the 
various National Anti-Poverty Strategy and National Social Inclusion Action 
Plans including the NAPSincl and other policy processes associated with the 
EU Open Method of Coordination.15  
  
The Department’s weak status in the hierarchy of Departments combined with 
weak policy capacity means it had little power to resist policy set outside the 
Department by international processes, other government Departments, 
political parties or social partnership processes.16 Within the Department 
there is tension between those who believe the Department should take a 
                                                 
13 This internal preoccupation with effective delivery of income supports was compounded by 
serious administrative failures in 1981 and 1989. 
14 Citizens Information Board (previously Comhairle and National Social Services Board) 
which focuses on citizens’ information and administrative and technical issues related to the 
delivery of welfare (Acheson et al, 2004); Combat Poverty Agency has a statutory function to 
advise the Minister on poverty-related policy, the National Pensions Board, the Family 
Support Agency 
15 These are ongoing and post-date the period of this research (end 2006).  
16 For example the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform’s imposition of the 2004 
Habitual Residence Rule 
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leading role in social security debate and those who focus on its 
administrative role delivering policy developed elsewhere.  
 
The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) leaves much 
of its social policy function to its statutory body, the training and employment 
agency FÁS (previously AnCo). DETE statutory organisations (including FÁS, 
Enterprise Ireland and the Competitiveness Council) promote activation and 
welfare to work-related social security policy. Historically the DETE had an 
obstructive working relationship with The DSW. While the ‘turf war’ was more 
about institutional issues than policy, ideological differences are evident 
between the two Departments. The underpinning attitude of the DETE often 
portrays social security as an obstacle to employment.  
 
Various attempts to co-ordinate policy across the two Departments include 
Programme Managers (1992), the Tax Strategy Group (1995), a Strategy 
Group on Long and Short-Term Unemployment (1997) and a more recent 
committee focused on welfare to work and activation issues. Since 1998 the 
Departments are required to work together under EU processes to deliver the 
National Employment Action Plan (NEAP) and also collaborate through the 
Senior Officials Group on Social Inclusion. The relationship is now more 
nuanced but still characterised by conflicting positions and significant gaps in 
coordination and data-sharing (Indecon, 2005). Institutional overlaps between 
the FÁS employment support services and the DSFA jobs support unit remain 
unresolved and are the subject of negotiation in the senior officials group.17  
 
The more senior Department of Finance (DOF) is both ideologically and 
pragmatically associated with low public expenditure (Lee, 1989). O’Connell 
and Rottman (1992:231) argued that its legacy was to be ‘opposed in 
principle to increases in state expenditure and taxes and in particular to 
increased commitments to social welfare’. This natural social conservatism of 
                                                 
17 In 2003 the Minister for Employment, Trade and Enterprise, Mary Harney, in an example 
of Irish pragmatism, offered FÁS to the Minister for the DSFA. The latter declined the offer 
because the Department believed that if institutional reform was to take place it needed to be 
a more considered and less pragmatic reform than that on offer. 
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the Irish elites (Adshead, 2008) and fear of escalating public expenditure was 
reinforced by the experience of the high rise in spending of the 1990s. 
Compared, for example, to the employment policy focus of the UK Treasury, 
the DOF has an underdeveloped policy agenda and is more interested in 
keeping spending down than in how public money is spent. The Public 
Expenditure Unit (PEU) which links the DSFA to the DOF is conservative 
about public spending. With a reputation for ‘pouring cold water’ over policy 
innovation, it vetoes spending in various ways, controlling the drafting of 
papers, refusing to adopt consensus reports and pressurising DSFA Ministers 
to cut current expenditure. The key policy priorities of Economic and 
Monetary Union, generating economic growth and avoiding borrowing, 
dominated the 1990s and to some degree expenditure implications rather 
than ideological positions drove decision-making. However, the DOF has a 
clear pro-market ideological policy agenda. It vigorously resisted the NAPS 
and Active Labour Market Programmes and contested proposals for 
refundable tax credits or using the revenue system to administer social 
protection.  
 
The Department of the Taoiseach has no specific policy responsibilities in the 
area of social security but co-ordinates government departments involved in 
social partnership and NAPS institutions. The General Secretary to the 
Government, the most powerful civil servant in the country, heads this 
Department and attends all Cabinet meetings, chairs the NAPS Inter-
Departmental Committee, the NESC and the NESF and national wage 
agreements and plays a key role linking political, civil service and social 
partnership actors. To break the dominance of Finance, various governments 
tried to develop a counterpoint institutional power in the Department of the 
Taoiseach (and during the period 1992–1994 a Department of the 
Tánaiste)18. Other methodological tools such as poverty proofing and gender 
mainstreaming were developed as potential counterbalances. However, no 
innovation has so far managed to break the monopoly role of Finance.  
                                                 
18 In the mid-1990s the Department of the Tánaiste played a co-ordinating role and 
developed the NESF which provides input into social security policy development. 
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Other Departments or government agencies institutionally relate to the social 
security policy community. The Health Service Executive administers the 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance scheme and local authorities administer 
the Rental Assistance Scheme. The Department of Education and Science 
has a common interest in the use of social security payments to fund adult 
participation in second chance and third-level education. Farm Assist income 
maintenance payment overlaps with Department of Agriculture incomes 
policy agenda.  
 
4.2  Multi-level governance  
When examining the emerging international policy community it is interesting 
to note an emerging site for policy in the new north/south bodies and the 
Ministerial Council as well as the British Irish council. To date implementation 
and administrative issues like staff development, fraud control, migration and 
information technology have been progressed in a cross-border policy 
context. It is likely that as these institutions evolve more cross-border policy 
development will happen.  
 
Ireland’s colonial history is evident in Ireland’s participation in a social 
security policy exchange network of English-speaking countries including the 
UK, US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Policy shopping or policy 
transfer opportunities also arise through membership of international 
institutions including the United Nations related social security institutions 
International Labour Organisation and International Social Security 
Association. As discussed in Section Six, Ireland’s membership of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also 
influences Irish policy discourse. By far the most important international 
policy influence however is the European Union (EU).  
 
Laffan and O’Donnell (1998:157) argue that membership of the EU is 
different to that of other international organisations ‘as it alters the external 
 33
Ideas, interests and institutions; explaining Irish social security policy                 Mary Murphy  
environment of the traditional nation state and its internal dynamic of policy 
making’. Ireland has adapted to the administrative and political demands of 
multi-levelled governance in the European Union. The EU policy system is 
complex and characterised by multi-level governance where national and 
supra-national institutions and politicians, bureaucrats and civil society actors 
engage in a multitude of co-operative working arrangements. Cram (1997) 
understands the EU as a bureaucracy where policy entrepreneurs seek to 
promote its potential role and independent agenda and expand its 
competencies by engaging in agenda setting and policy formulation, but not 
implementation. It invests in policy learning processes including networks, 
exchanges, conferences and research (Brine, 2000). 
 
There is no commitment to EU-level social security convergence (Hay, 
2004b). The EU principle of subsidiarity means that social security policy is 
developed at domestic level and EU member states are protective of their 
domestic social security systems (Ó Cinnéide, 2005). EU social security 
policy is driven by a free labour market ethos, which promotes the free 
movement of socially insured workers and those seeking employment. There 
is also an ‘anti-social-dumping’ agenda, which, in the context of competition-
driven global trends, seeks to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ by putting in place 
minimum income guarantees.  
 
There were only two legal directives in the last two decades – the 1992 EU 
Directive on Minimum Income Guarantee (which did not fundamentally 
change Irish social security practice) and the Part-Time Work Directive 
(which required only moderate changes in social security provision for part-
time workers). The political and policy influence is harder to measure but it is 
likely the EU was a very strong positive influence that moved Ireland from a 
traditional, Catholic, anti-poverty ethos to a social policy which promoted 
social inclusion if not equality. 
 
While social security is not a strategic policy area for EU relations the Irish 
policy community does interact with relevant EU institutions. These include 
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the Directorate General V (DGV), the Social Dialogue, the Social Policy 
Forum, the Structural Funds and Social Inclusion budgets, the Social 
Protection Committee, the Employment Committee and the Open Method of 
Co-ordination of monetary, pensions, employment and social inclusion policy. 
Each Commission Directorate (DG) has its own policy-making style, strategy 
and institutional features that influence policy-making patterns. DGV 5, the 
social policy and employment directorate, is characterised by a 
heterogeneous collection of mainly politically weak organisations arranged 
around social and civil dialogue (Ó Cinnéide, 1993, 2005; Frazer, 2002).  
 
The Lisbon Agenda promotes a three-legged strategy of competitiveness, job 
growth and social inclusion. It prompted a new policy process or governance 
process known as the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) (Ó Cinnéide, 
2005; Frazer, 2002; O’Donnell and Thomas, 1998) where national states 
enter into a process of co-ordination agreed at Council level, of strategic 
action plans with long-term common objectives and short-term actions. 
These are monitored by way of common indicators, joint EU evaluation, 
public accountability and the exchange of good practice (Frazer, 2002)   
More a co-ordination of process than a co-ordination of policy, OMC is an 
increasingly dominant policy style across five policy areas including social 
inclusion, pensions and employment-related social security issues. De la 
Porte and Pochet (2004) view OMC as a politically significant governance 
mechanism that allows the EU to act as a semi-sovereign policy system. 
Ferrara et al (2000) highlight the post-regulatory approach to governance that 
stressed the importance of hegemony (dominant discourses) for securing 
international co-operation. In all OMC processes this hegemony privileges 
fiscal discipline over social needs or social cohesion and employment is the 
cornerstone of social inclusion policy. A new language and technical 
discourse of policy-making includes concepts such as targets, indicators and 
mobilisation of all actors.  
 
In the absence of OMC processes having statutory powers, there is only 
emerging evidence to confirm Cerny’s expectation of increased multi-level 
governance. The OMC potential to impact depends on the capacity of the 
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domestic policy community to use the OMC indicators as political tools to 
lobby for improved domestic performance (Laffan and O’Donnell, 1998:170). 
The Irish state is selectively filtering its engagement with international social 
security discourse. Irish policy-makers are in control: ‘I think maybe we are 
inclined to invoke Europe… when actually the lines of policy are what we 
would do anyway’ (Smith, 2005:183).  
 
4.3  Policy elite   
The policy community has an inner policy network or a policy elite. A 
combination of power and knowledge-resources determines membership 
(primarily Ministers and Ministerial political and personal advisers and key 
civil servants). The membership of the mid 1990’s Tax Strategy Group 
(TSG)19 mirrors this inner network. TSG is an inter-departmental committee 
chaired by the DOF and comprised of senior officials and advisers from the 
DOF, the DOT, the DETE, the DSFA and the Revenue Commissioners. It 
played a particularly important policy role in the 1992–1997 period, and, while 
of lesser strategic importance in recent years, still remains powerful. No 
social partners or non-elected office holders are included in the inner policy 
network.20 The Senior Officials Group on Social Inclusion who report to the 
Cabinet Sub-Committee on Social Inclusion may also be regarded as a 
national policy elite. These policy elites still find it very difficult to achieve 
cross-departmental co-ordination. 
 
Hall and Taylor (1996), Deacon (2003) and Cerny et al (2005) define an 
emerging alternative network based not on power or knowledge resources 
but on expertise and skills. Policy mediators or entrepreneurs are found in 
small informal networks of powerful individual actors. These networks are 
exist in the overlap of domestic/international institutions. The emerging 
                                                 
19 The TSG examines and develops proposals for taxation, PRSI and levies for the Budget 
and Finance Bills. The group examines the strategic approach for a general social welfare 
package and assesses the interaction of proposals on income tax, PRSI and levies with 
other social welfare proposals, including child income support, and in particular the impact of 
this interaction on the labour market and income distribution. 
20 However, TSG minutes record references to campaigning positions of ICTU, IBEC and the 
Community Pillar as well as the ESRI. 
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transnational policy elite comprises experts working in social partnership 
institutions (but not necessarily the social partners) and the ESRI and its 
technical experts who play a briefing/information role for the whole policy 
community. It also includes technical experts associated with the European 
Open Method of Coordination group of policy experts and some Irish policy 
actors who play lead roles in EU and other international organisations (Laffan 
and O’Donnell, 1998) and who bring international experience and discourse 
back to the Irish social policy community.  
 
These policy entrepreneurs can form a distinctive policy network without 
formal power but with extensive knowledge resources and they have the 
capacity to bring new thinking into the policy community. Their subjective 
preferences, professional backgrounds, institutional affiliation and cognitive 
make-up will influence how and which ideas pass through institutions and this 
will impact on options for change.  
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5   The policy community: power and politics 
This section examines the contribution more formal political power has to 
make to social security policy. It also examines corporatist, pluralist or elitist 
forms of power in the Irish social security policy community. We can expect 
that strong political leadership or champions could drive policy change but we 
have already suggested in Section Three that the peculiarity of Irish political 
institutions has a strong impact on the style of Irish policy-making.  
 
5.1  Irish political parties    
The historical origin of Irish political parties lies in a post-independence civil 
war intra-nationalist split, which dominated Irish politics and militated against 
a left–right ideological divide or a strong social democratic tradition in Irish 
politics (Mair, 1992:389). We noted earlier how Ireland’s distinctive post-
colonial political institutions and populist culture can be distinguished from 
other countries with liberal welfare regimes. PRSTV dominates the Irish 
state; it can structurally account for multi-partyism and coalition governments 
and is culturally connected to consensus, corporatism and incremental 
unambitious policy-making. It is not surprising, given the moderate nature of 
the main parties (Smith, 2005:186), that a difference in policy emphasis is not 
the point of departure between political parties. What seems to differentiate 
parties is the level of ambition for a planned approach to social security 
reform and levels of appreciation about how social security policy relates to 
national development.  
 
Who is in government matters. The Dáil and Dáil Committees have an 
underdeveloped role in policy-making and committee work is often dominated 
by delivery issues (a by-product of a clientalistic political culture). While in 
coalition governments the early negotiation of programmes for government 
can mean that smaller parties have considerable power to negotiate the 
policy focus, this also has to be balanced against the sheer power and 
dominance of Fianna Fáil who held ministerial office for eighteen of the 
twenty years examined.  
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Fianna Fáil, being the most populist, is more cautious than other parties 
about negative changes, more likely to engage in short-term electoral budget 
cycles and less likely to have a planned approach to policy (Cousins, 2005). 
The party’s populist approach to policy development is a strong causal factor 
for the underdevelopment of various aspects of Irish social security policy. 
However, within Fianna Fáil there is significant diversity in Ministerial style 
and competence. The personality of various Ministers can be associated with 
various policy decisions,21 and Ministers are wary of the complex social 
security system and depend on the expertise of the civil service. A legacy of 
this close working relationship is the degree to which populist Fianna Fáil 
approaches to decision-making permeated the thinking and practices of civil 
servants. In 1992 Labour, in order to break this close relationship, initiated 
the use of ‘political advisers’ and ‘programme managers’.22 The role has 
since varied widely and they are not perceived to have had significant 
influence.  
 
The area under examination can be divided into three political periods: 1987–
1992, 1992–1997 and 1997–2002. The stop–start nature of Irish activation 
strategies (programmes are often based on pilots and experience periodic 
retrenchment) can be explained by inconsistent policy across these stages. 
This suggests variations in political commitment to a fully developed welfare-
to-work strategy and different degrees of emphasis on the degree to which 
policy should be offensive and supportive or defensive and punitive. From 
1987–1992 centre or centre-right governments held power. In this period of 
fiscal rectitude the Fianna Fáil government had little social security ambition 
but understood the political expediency of protecting the incomes of the 
poorest. It readily accepted the consensus and expert analysis of the Labour 
Party initiated Commission on Social Welfare (Ireland, 1986) and gained the 
                                                 
21 The capacity of the Minister to argue his/her case against more senior ministries appears 
to be crucial. Minister Woods, for example, was able to set and win policy agendas while 
Minister Coughlan appeared to have had little success in defending social security interests. 
Urban Ministers are more sensitive to the electoral impact of social security reform. 
22 The advisers liaise with senior civil servants and act as a link between the Cabinet, the 
Oireachtas Sub-Committees and the Civil Service. 
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consensus of the social partners in the Programme for National Recovery 
(1997) to maintain the real value of social security.  
 
In the second period, 1992–1997, a centre-left coalition23 government 
engaged with social democratic EU and UN dialogue in a reforming period 
marked by more ambitious policy processes including the Tax Strategy 
Group, the Expert Working Group on Integration of Tax and Social Welfare 
and a National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS). Labour’s influence in 
government increased the pace and volume of policy debate about reform, 
but resources for reform were limited. From 1994 to 1997 a non-Fianna Fáil 
Minister from a small left-wing Democratic Left Party, Minister de Rossa, held 
the social security welfare ministry. He appeared more willing to expose his 
party to electoral risk and was more ideologically orientated towards gender 
reform and a more rigorous but offensive activation model. Actively engaging 
with the international policy community, the socialist Minister looked to the 
EU social model and launched NAPS under the auspices of the UN Summit 
on Social Development in 1995.  
 
From 1997 to 2005 a centre-right government engaged with a more neo-
liberal, OECD-inspired rhetoric. The availability of resources and institutional 
capacity was not matched with political ambition for social security reform. 
The period was a missed opportunity characterised by active resistance by 
the DOF to developing anti-poverty and income adequacy strategies under 
NAPS (Johnston, 2002; Hanan, 2002). The second half of this period was 
marked by fewer resources and, since 2002, a period of robust retrenchment 
under a more pronounced neo-liberal PD–FF coalition. There is evidence of 
again a smaller party (Progressive Democrats) leading social security policy 
discourse in relation to non-nationals, conditionality and lone parents. This is 
again consistent with smaller parties advocating more radical policy agendas. 
However, towards the end of this period there was a distinctive softening of 
rhetoric by Fianna Fáil. This change of attitude to social security, reflected in 
                                                 
23 A Rainbow Coalition of Labour, Fine Gael and Democratic Left followed a Labour–Fianna 
Fáil coalition. 
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higher rate increases in subsequent budgets, was attributed to electoral 
losses in the 2004 local elections.    
 
Politics and who is in government matters. Fianna Fáil has clearly dominated 
the last two decades and its populist approach to policy development is a 
strong causal factor for the underdevelopment of various aspects of Irish 
social security policy. It is also clear that the personal characteristics of the 
individual power holders matter.  
 
5.2  Non-statutory actors  
Murphy (2002) identifies three coexisting principal patterns of organised 
interests: pluralism, corporatism and elitism. This section reflects on such 
interests and examines whether corporatist, pluralist or elitist forms of power 
have explanatory potential to account for the style of Irish social security 
reform.  
 
5.2.1  Corporatism 
Irish social partnership (NESF, 1997; McCarthy, 1998, 1999; Murray and 
Teahon, 1997, O Riain 2006) is a different animal to continental state 
corporatism. Corporatist structures were renewed in 1987, when government 
faced into a difficult period of retrenchment and re-established social 
partnership. Trade unions, employers and farmers worked in several 
overlapping institutional spaces to develop consensus on policy strategies 
and to negotiate and monitor national wage agreements. This enabled 
governments to ‘adopt reforms with reduced electoral and social risks’ (Natali 
and Rhodes,1998:7). In 1994 Irish social partnership broadened to include 
the NESF and in 1996 part of the community and voluntary sector was 
incorporated into partnership structures (Acheson et al, 2004). Some credit 
social partnership as the cause of Ireland’s more humane welfare trajectory, 
relative to the UK or the US (Kiely et al, 1999; Nolan et al, 2000; Kennelly 
and O’Shea, 1998; Daly and Yeates, 2003). Others argue that social 
partnership can, through co-option, limit protest and smother the potential for 
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more radical change (Allen, 2000; Broderick, 2002; Ó Cinnéide, 1999a; 
Murphy, 2002).  
 
In other corporate institutions, both trade unions and employers may be 
directly involved in the administration of social security benefit. This is not the 
case in Ireland where social partners have little real expertise, interest in or 
ambition for social security (Hardiman, 1998; Cousins 2005). While there is 
evidence of PRSI changes on foot of business lobbying outside social 
partnership, both Peillion (2001) and Cousins (2005) argue that employers 
use their political capital in social partnership more to curtail the level of 
social expenditure, to influence the development of services useful to them 
and to veto change.24  
 
Trade union input in the first two national development programmes was 
significant but by 1996 trade unions had begun to limit their input to issues 
directly impacting on members. Cousins (2005) explained the paucity of the 
trade union contribution as a result of public sector unions having no direct 
interest in a means-tested social security system basically serving the poor. 
The interests of employed union members primarily fuel ICTU’s interest in 
social security policy (Hardiman,1998). These focus on low paid/casual 
worker issues, equality issues around parenting and maternity, child income 
support as it relates to childcare and pensions. Individual trade unions have 
developed specific social security policy interests because members are 
involved in the administration of social security (IMPACT, SIPTU, CPSU, 
PSEU) or because members in low-aid or precarious employment have 
specific social security needs (Mandate, SIPTU). ICTU has a weak practical 
capacity to develop policy and its participation in social security related 
processes is under-resourced. Individual senior trade union officials are part 
of the policy elite, brokering ideas and transferring policy learning from 
abroad (Laffan and O’Donnell, 1998).  
 
                                                 
24 ISME, a competing business lobby group, unusually in the Irish culture and from outside 
partnership, has engaged in active anti-welfare social security discourse (Allen, 1998). 
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Members of the agricultural and rural based lobby groups focus primarily on 
rural-specific issues (pensions for farmers, Farm Assist and the social 
security needs of farming women).  
 
The Community and Voluntary Pillar (CVP) is a social partnership 
participation mechanism comprised of a large number of diverse 
organisations representing specific interest groups (Acheson et al, 
2004:103). Only a small number of the individual organisations directly input 
into overall social security policy. Others interact on specific social security 
issues affecting their immediate membership. Effective CVP participation has 
required collapsing individual organisational interests into coherent pillar-level 
policy positions. This causes tactical tensions, internal power struggles and 
strained internal relations within the CVP. The sectors’ 1994 co-option into 
national corporate structures is unique to Ireland. It can be reflected 
positively as the strength of interest groups in Ireland (Healy, 1998) or as a 
state strategy to silence ideological debate or alternative political discourse 
expected from a third sector (Broderick, 2002: Murphy, 2002). CVP policy 
relevance has ebbed and flowed. High unemployment in the mid-1990s 
necessitated the problem-solving presence of unemployed/anti-poverty 
groups in national policy processes. However, as high unemployment 
decreased such relevance diminished and the gaps between the CVP 
agenda and the business agenda widened (Larragy, 2006)  
 
With less power and capacity than other pillars, CVP is more accurately 
described as a pluralist lobby group than a corporate power with resources to 
negotiate (Hardiman, 1998). The sector’s most significant role was 
negotiating social welfare increases. However, an important breakthrough in 
adequacy came in budgets 2005–2007. This breakthrough is associated not 
so much with social partnership but with a Fianna Fáil 2004 local election 
defeat. Following a bruising 2004 local election Fianna Fáil, eager to 
establish social inclusion credentials, removed a neo-liberal Finance minister, 
publicly courted a social inclusion dialogue and committed to a series of 
social welfare rate increases. To argue that political dynamics rather than 
social partnership dynamics were more central to the enhanced adequacy 
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agenda is not to diminish the CVP role but to argue that its power to achieve 
change was more pluralist than corporatist. Hardiman (1998:141) argues that 
‘the input of organisations representing the most disadvantaged is likely to be 
treated as “residual category” confined to securing whatever is left over after 
established interests have their say’.    
 
In practical terms, apart from commitments to social security rate increases, 
scant social security policy change has been directly negotiated in social 
partnership. Cousins (2005) concludes that ‘with or without social partnership 
the Irish social security system would look more or less the same’. However, 
to rest with Cousins’ conclusion would underestimate the power of social 
partnership to provide an ideational framework for broader Irish policy. The 
role of Irish social partnership is more about maintaining a consensus around 
a shared macro-understanding of an economic model than contributing in a 
detailed way to social security development. Over time social partnership 
institutions developed into the National Economic and Social Development 
Office, an influential, government-funded think-tank which overviews a wide 
range of policy debate.  
 
Social partnership-populated institutions play a powerful ideational role in 
developing and maintaining a consensual framework around a specific socio-
economic model that subordinates social policy goals to the needs of the 
economy and employers. This is further discussed in Section Five which 
examines ideational power, but some key stages of ideational discourse in 
social partnership are introduced here. 
 
Breathnach (2005) identifies, in her work, three clear stages of social 
partnership over the 1987–2005 period. An early foundation phase focuses 
on breaking the vicious socio-economic cycle and building a shared 
alternative future analysis; economic management dominates this phase. An 
expansion phase is marked with an increased focus on social/equality and 
sharing of benefits and an agenda that is increasingly broad but fragmented. 
Finally, the transition phase refocuses on economics and a process of 
narrowing and controlling the agenda.  
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Likewise, Ó Riain (2008:165–186) clearly distinguishes three phases of 
social partnership. The first phase is associated with national social 
partnership institutions and is characterised by ‘macro economic 
stabilisation’. The focus is on attracting foreign direct investment with tax 
incentives, and welfare is characterised by cutbacks and stabilisation. The 
second phase Ó Riain calls ‘developmental network statism’, characterised 
by the extension of the partnership regime, a deepening of the innovation 
system and managing growth and inflation. The third stage is that of a 
disciplinary state and marketisation characterised by ‘a growth machine’ 
focused on lower taxes and increasing domestic consumption with a 
narrowing of the development strategy and institutions and a reassertion of 
central state control.  
 
Clearly, even if the social partnership process has not directly altered social 
security provision it is perceived as a powerful place to influence policy, and 
those excluded from its institution processes are excluded from key policy 
formation processes. Its most significant influence however is ideational – it 
sets the boundaries for what is considered plausible policy discourse about 
policy change in Ireland. 
 
5.2.2  Pluralism  
Social security is distinguishable from the rest of the mixed welfare economy 
in that all social security income supports are state delivered and tax or PRSI 
funded. Apart from direct civil service staff interests (represented by CPSU, 
PSEU, IMPACT and SIPTU) there are no large institutional insiders within the 
social security policy community. The engagement of wider civil society or 
the Community and Voluntary sector with social security policy predates 
social partnership and most organisations continue to influence through 
pluralist relations.  
 
The Community and Voluntary sector includes a wide array of organisations 
operating from different power bases. The most dominant and perhaps most 
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powerful institutional actor is the Community and Voluntary Pillar (discussed 
under corporatism above). The sector inputs through the National Anti-
Poverty Strategy, local development structures, pre-budget forums and 
traditional forms of direct lobbying and campaigning. Some larger national 
organisations maintain a coherent institutional engagement with government 
Departments including regular contact and bilateral meetings with both 
Departmental officials and Ministers, direct lobbying of politicians, circulation 
of policy literature, lobby days and attending political clinics in local 
constituencies. The sector also participates in consultation processes under 
the auspices of the NAPS, customer service initiatives or one-off 
Departmental policy consultations. Most activity however is focused on 
DSFA-organised annual pre- and post-budget ‘listening’ forums where up to 
40 groups submit social security budget submissions.  
 
While some groups have influenced agenda-setting, delivery issues and 
income adequacy outcomes, much of this discourse has been ‘voice without 
influence’ (Lister, 2004). The growing consultative voice of the sector ‘has not 
proved enough to change policy priorities’ (Hardiman, 1998:142). Why is 
this? It was argued earlier that the Irish political system advantages groups 
able to organise and promote their interests (Coleman, 2006). To echo 
Hardiman (1998:122): 
 
we may find that at least part of the explanation for the relative lack of progress 
in redressing these inequalities may be found in a closer analysis of the patterns 
of interest representation in the form of party policies and interest group 
formation.  
 
The sector does not have the policy-influencing power of a well-organised 
vested interest, and the absence of a national social security umbrella group 
dedicated to cross-sectoral campaigning on specific social security issues is 
noticeable. The National Campaign for Welfare Reform, formed as a national 
campaign to support the publication of the CSW in 1986, had lost momentum 
by the end of that decade and there has been no national campaign body 
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since.25 There is little sense that social security is a political issue – 
politicians rarely worry about losing votes because of welfare. There is a 
perception within the policy community of duplication of work, inefficient use 
of resources and, relative to scale, ineffective impact (WRC, 2001), 
fragmentation and at times lack of trust and territorial dispute (Acheson et al, 
2004).26  
 
While there are distributional alliances including ‘Share the Wealth’ marches 
and anti-cuts campaigns, anti-poverty groups do not always demonstrate 
solidarity with other groups (Allen, 1998). Like the contingent nature of the 
social security system, each group's social security agenda tends to be one-
dimensional. While agendas are at times brought together through the 
mechanisms of the Community and Voluntary Pillar and/or Community 
Platform, these joint agendas tend to be combined lists of demands collated 
for negotiation purposes rather than coherent national campaigns.  
 
In the British context Whiteley and Winyard (1987) and Lister (1988) 
observed the ease with which governments consciously play groups off 
against each other and the importance of members of the British anti-poverty 
sector acting as a single, unified lobby. Irish advocacy coalitions were 
effective in the short-term goals they set themselves.27 Given the sensitivity 
of proportional representation to well-organised sectoral interests, the 
challenge is increasing the capacity to organise into a more proactive, strong 
vested interest on a longer time scale (Coleman, 2006; Harvey 2008).  
                                                 
25 Forty groups came together to successfully lobby against the retrenchment (‘Dirty 
Dozen’) in 1992 and again to campaign against the ‘Savage Sixteen’ in 2004. 
However, a conscious decision was made not to develop a national social security 
lobby group. Despite clear capacity to work together the preference is for ring-fenced 
activity in specific areas. 
26 Civil society social security policy input is channelled through an infrastructure of welfare 
rights and citizens information organisations and free legal aid centres. These focus on 
access to information and report back to the DSFA about policy anomalies and delivery 
standards. They tend not to directly lobby about wider distributional issues or engage in 
broader structural policy debates. Local groups representing people living in poverty do 
organise into national networks and federations.  
27 These include the 1996 National Campaign for Welfare Reform, the Community Platform, 
the Community and Voluntary Pillar or ad hoc campaigns against the ‘Dirty Dozen’ and 
‘Savage Sixteen’ or the late 1990s Open Your Eyes to Child Poverty Initiative, the Older and 
Bolder Campaign and the Equality and Rights Alliance.  
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Acheson et al (2004:197) argue that the state plays a key role ‘in structuring 
the civic space in which voluntary action occurs’ and that ‘interaction of state 
drivers with cultural and ideological forces’ shape voluntary action and 
development. This institutional space is state-controlled and meaningful 
distributional debate is limited (Acheson et al, 2004; Montague, 2001).28 
Such a relationship has been described by Broderick (2002) as a ‘smothering 
embrace’. The sector’s capacity to be an effective driver of change has been 
curtailed both by state (or Fianna Fáil) strategies to control or limit the 
development of the sector (McCashin, 2004) and by the sector’s own failure 
to act cohesively (Acheson et al, 2004).  
 
Harvey (2008) observes how the Irish state, by way of funding, regulation 
and institutional reform, has proactively attempted to orientate the 
Community and Voluntary sector (and hence civil society) towards a 
particular development model. The shift illustrates how the Irish competition 
state has attempted to manage domestic political tensions and mitigate 
societal reaction as it subordinates social policy to the needs of the economy.  
Harvey (2008) describes a more recent 2002 shift to a more managerialist  
culture as having an ‘asphyxiating’ impact  on civil society. Without power to 
set the agenda or influence ideational debate, the most significant power of 
the sector is its veto power.  
 
The community and voluntary sector’s most powerful role is as a veto player 
– the potential electoral power of, e.g. Women in the Home, pensioners and 
lone parent’s groups can act as breaks on more regressive and progressive 
ambitious change agendas. However, the sector does not necessarily use 
this veto power strategically. McCashin (1992:5) accuses the sector of shying 
away from hard reform choices and argues that it is ‘inconsistent to chastise 
policy-makers… welfare pressure groups have not grasped and accepted the 
overall strategy of the CSW…. there are nettles to be grasped’.  
                                                 
28 Quinn (2005) highlighted that successful pre-budget submissions lobbied for one specific 
change, but many groups choose to present elaborate reports and use the pre-budget 
submission process as a broad media strategy (Montague, 2001). 
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5.2.3  Elitism  
Competition state theorists expect the business elite to be increasingly 
influential. Hardiman (1998) notes how business elites enjoy the advantage 
of seeking to influence governments fully committed to a national model of 
development that promotes competitiveness over social policy and that 
prioritises business interests rather than redistribution. Raj and McMahon 
(2003) found that elites influenced Irish privatisation policy processes. Elitist 
theories of power are likely to be relevant in the pensions policy area where 
establishment of the Pensions Board signified a governance shift that 
resulted in a partial privatisation of pensions. Domestic private industry has 
also impacted on PRSI rate-setting, and interests representing foreign direct 
investors have more recently influenced PRSI policy. Employer lobbies have 
also influenced Irish labour market-led immigration policy. The most powerful 
influence of the business elite is unlikely to be visible in policy institutions but 
to happen through personal and social networking (Schmitt, 1998). Byrne 
(2005) and Hardiman (1998:140) argue that as long as governments rely 
heavily on corporate donations for their funding there will always be a 
systematic bias in political decisions.  
 
The Catholic Church has long been regarded as an Irish elite, though it has 
less direct influence in social security policy than in health and education 
policy where it has had much more material and social capital. Catholic 
Church-based organisations operate from quite powerful but declining power 
bases (Schmitt, 1998:217). Pellion (2001:176) concludes that ‘the church 
possesses no stake in social security, about which it has little to say’. 
Hardiman (1998) concurs, arguing that it now tends to act as spokesperson 
for marginalised communities through social justice interest groups (CORI, 
SVP and Bishops Conferences as well as the justice desks of the 
Vincentians, the Jesuits and the Mercy orders). Catholic Church groups are 
not homogenous and there is ideological debate within and between Catholic 
groups. The dominant Church voice in the social security debate is CORI 
(formerly CMRS) which throughout the past two decades has focused on a 
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basic income and adequacy lobby. With quite significant lobbying power, 
CORI is credited as ‘undoubtedly the most effective’ and has impacted on 
social security adequacy policy through creative long-term campaigning 
strategies (Powell and Guerin, 1997:16; Acheson et al, 2004:87).  
 
The Irish social security policy community is noticeably devoid of think-tanks 
and has only a small knowledge elite. The social security policy reading circle 
is small and dominated by the ESRI, the largest and most technically able 
think-tank or academic research body in the country. Up to 2003 the ESRI 
held a key data set for the ‘Living in Ireland’ survey and is to some extent a 
‘policy monopoly’ in social security research, with significant influence on 
policy language, definitions and technical discourse. While commissioned 
work tends to be quantitative, under its own initiative the ESRI publishes 
annual budget policy commentaries focused on critical analysis of social 
security policy. These are taken seriously in policy debate and input directly to 
the senior Tax Strategy Group. Other consultancy firms tend to be contracted 
on projects with narrow technical terms of reference determined by civil 
servants or politicians. A small number of independent consultants are hired 
by civil society actors to develop alternative policy positions to reform specific 
contingencies of social welfare. None of these consultants contribute to public 
discourse in the media.  
 
Lack of access to data has effectively hampered academic research in this 
area. Given that since 2003 the CSO hold the data set for the EU Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC), there will be increased academic 
participation in relevant policy research. This is already evidenced by new 
research groupings on specific research topics. However, there is as yet no 
academic research group devoted to social security and there remain few 
funding sources for social science research. This, combined with exclusive 
membership of many Irish social security institutional processes, contributes 
to a limited engagement in social security from Irish universities.29,30 
                                                 
29 Faculties engaging in social security tend to be sociology or social policy. There is limited 
input from law faculties, economics faculties and multidisciplinary faculties such as equality 
or policy studies. 
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Sampson (2004) highlights the huge transfer of power to the media elite in 
the UK. Irish popular media can influence decisions. Montague and Trench 
(2000:48) observe how ‘once a piece of research has been aired in  public it 
passes much more easily into the policy process’. There is little institutional 
social security expertise or serious analysis,31 rather the media is used to 
campaign and lobby as groups try to influence decision-making by 
influencing public opinion. The growing awareness of the need to influence 
ideational thinking is reflected in how lobby groups have developed media 
strategies, employ press officers or use private media consultancy 
companies to manage specific campaigns (ibid:48). 
 
Concluding this section we can see various power holders with influence 
and/or veto power in the Irish social security policy community. Individual civil 
servants have been powerful in either progressing or blocking the passage of 
policy or in furthering the agendas of certain lobby groups. Corporatist, 
pluralist and elitist power models also have explanatory potential.  The Irish 
political system advantages groups able to organise and promote their 
interests. Groups with material and other resources to both organise 
members and articulate their interests have been more influential. 
Conversely, the least organised and most disadvantaged are residual and 
are least likely to voice their concerns in a way that influences the policy 
process and policy outcomes. Key individual trade union and community and 
voluntary sector leaders have also had ideational influence. In a small policy 
community relations between those in power also matter and the community 
is dominated by middle-class males. The community remains relatively 
insular, strategically using European and international discourse to amplify 
domestic policy agendas.   
  
                                                                                                                                          
30 The Policy Institute in Trinity College Dublin (TCD) has published three social 
security policy reports (Quinn, 2000; Healy, 2003; Murphy, 2008). 
31 Some national and local radio stations and local newspapers have initiated advice-
orientated social security slots but no national current affairs medium has a social security 
focused programme and there is no specialist social security magazine or journal. 
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6  Patterns of discourse  
Frazer (1992:3) argues ‘that public support for the social welfare system is 
cultivated by open debate and political leadership’. Cerny et al (2005) and 
Torping (1999) stress the political construction of ideas as important causal 
factors with explanatory power in relation to social security change. Ideas 
play a role in the social construction of Irish social security discourse. 
Analysing the discursive practices helps us understand how knowledge and 
meaning is produced in this policy community.  
 
Irish political culture is a strong user of rhetoric. Its model of development is 
legitimated by rhetoric about social inclusion. Rhetoric and construction of 
sensitive but ambiguous language plays an important role particularly in 
relation to conditionality, activation and gender (Murphy, 2003; Nolan, 
2002).32 One civil servant described how policy-makers are sensitive to the 
use of language:  
 
These things were sold softly by people who might have had harder agendas; 
we have ‘get the scrounger’ mentality wrapped up in the ‘helping hand’ culture 
of the Department. 
 
Discourse reflects ‘a group of statements which provide a language for 
talking about, or representing, knowledge about a particular topic. It rules in 
certain ways of talking and rules out other alternatives’ (Hall, 1997:44). Cox’s 
(1998a) ideational theory attempts to explain change by examining the 
passage of ideas through institutions. Blyth (2002:33–44) distinguishes 
between three stages of ideational change: ideas are used first as ‘weapons’ 
to argue for change, then as ‘blueprints’ to map the direction of change 
before finally being used as ‘cognitive locks’ to lock-in particular policy 
prescriptions and avoid alternative policy proposals. This raises the question 
                                                 
32 A strategy employed by Minister Woods was to ‘talk hard’ publicly about the need for a 
‘punitive’ Job Search programme while arguing simultaneously in Cabinet that the real value 
of unemployment payments needed to be maintained. The ambiguous rhetoric of ‘systematic 
engagement’ in the National Employment Action Plan convinced many to leave the live 
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of how Irish policy institutions process or block ideas and where and how 
Irish ideas might be in a ‘cognitive lock’ (Connolly, 2007). This section 
examines how ideas are communicated, whether there is evidence of 
epistemic communities or policy monopolies, and what kind of discourse is 
evident in the Irish social security policy community. 
 
Ideology appears absent in the Irish state (Coakely, 2004:53). At first sight, a 
lack of left–right division between political parties and a consensus approach 
between classes in social partnership suggests a pragmatic, flexible state 
enabling innovative policy change to adapt to the global economy. However, 
this absence of debate does not mean an absence of ideology. The absence 
of debate may in fact be a result of consensus about ideology.  
 
The Irish state has always had a dominant hegemony. In the early days of 
the state this reflected the conservative, Catholic and patriarchal ideology 
(Ferriter, 2004a 337) and was maintained by a strong Church–State 
relationship. More recently this has softened somewhat but has also been 
augmented with a strong neo-liberal hegemony. Current hegemony is 
‘cognitively locked’ into a neo-liberal agenda processed through social 
partnership and other state institutions like the Industrial Development 
Authority and the National Competitiveness Council.  
 
Certain institutions, in the absence of well-resourced alternative policy 
advocacy coalitions, enjoy a monopoly role in Irish discourse. The ESRI 
analysis, for example, underpins social partnership (NESF and NESC) and 
anti-poverty institutions (Combat Poverty and OSI). Kirby (2002) argues that 
ESRI analysis is based on theoretical assumptions of ‘rational choice’ and 
that consequently poverty and social inclusion discourse is epistemologically 
rooted in classical economics theory. Such technical literature, focused on 
statistical measurement, dominates policy discourse, limits public debate and 
acts as a barrier to entry into the policy community.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
register. The NESC DWS can be read as an opportunity for empowerment or as a threat of 
more punitive sanctions for unemployed people. 
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As discussed earlier, a second type of policy monopoly happens through 
social partnership. This monopolises the process of debate, favouring 
consensus over conflict and maintaining a strong narrative of shared 
understanding where ‘social partners leave ideological differences outside 
the door and problem solve in the context of a shared understanding’ 
(McCarthy, 1998,1999; NESF, 1997; NESC, 2005; Connolly, 2007; Harvey, 
2008; Geoghegan and Powell, 2007). The state, explicitly and implicitly, by 
controlling funding and filtering social partnership participation, is able to 
mitigate dissent from hegemonic ‘shared understanding’. Organisations 
which have tried to raise critical debate comment on the difficulty 
encountered in so doing (WRC, 2001). Individuals who venture into public 
debate quickly find themselves silenced (Murphy, 2002).    
 
High levels of inequality are tolerated in a state dominated by a form of 
Catholic social teaching which focused, in the early years of the state, on 
more absolutist forms of poverty reduction and charity (Acheson et al, 2004; 
McLaughlin, 2002). This leads to political acceptance of a ‘solidarity without 
equality’ (Ó Riain and O’Connell, 2000:39). The impact of a shift to more 
individual values associated with neo-liberalism is likely to have further 
eroded societal support for equality. The patriarchal nature of the state 
explains its marked ambivalence to women’s employment and this is 
reinforced by unequal gender participation in decision-making matters.  
 
The dominant macro-discourse revolves around competitiveness and 
employment growth (Connolly, 2007). The dominant social security discourse 
revolves around technical debates about how to measure the perceived, 
socially-constructed policy problem of the day, work incentives and 
replacement ratios, definitions and measurement of unemployment, 
definitions and measurement of poverty/inequality and, most recently, labour 
market impacts of migration (Viet Wilson, 1998). It is possible to identify 
alternative discourse about a rights, equality and social spending approach. 
A less dominant discourse promotes family values, parenting and 
responsibility.  
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The ideational influence of international policy actors (OECD and EU in 
employment policy, EU in social inclusion policy and World Bank in pensions 
policy) is evident in Irish discourse albeit not as powerfully as might be 
expected of a competition state. There is for example consistency and 
overlap between the NESC (2005, 2006) and European Commission 
activation discourse. Irish policy entrepreneurs have opened up new reform 
agendas, transferred policy and influenced the pace and type of development 
of policies relating to activation and conditionality in Ireland. However, this 
paper argues that domestic political institutions and populist political culture 
make Ireland more immune to ‘radical’ policy prescriptions than other liberal 
regimes. This explains the more limited approach to activation and 
conditionality in Irish social security policy. One observer interviewed by the 
author linked the lack of ambition to the Proportional Representation (PR) 
electoral system: 
 
There is a much clearer policy direction in the UK; you have the Prime Minister 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister saying work, work, work, 
work, work, work. It’s bound to percolate down a lot more than where you have 
a less clear message. The main reason for the unclear Irish message is fear of 
electoral loss of votes: in Ireland this fear is far more intense because of 
Proportional Representation. 
 
 
6.1  Co-ordinative and communicative discourse 
Schmidt's (2000) concept of ‘co-coordinative discourse’ refers to situations 
where change is managed through a closed elite-level policy process 
confined to the type of problem solving or lesson drawing that leads to 
incremental reform. The alternative is ‘communicative discourse’, capable of 
promoting social learning and leading to a change in values and a more 
fundamental restructuring of policy. Schmidt (2000:306) concluded that 
countries manage adjustment to the external economy, 
 
not only because of their greater or lesser economic viability, their greater or lesser 
institutional capacities and better or worse policy responses but also because of their 
more or less convincing legitimating discourse. 
 
The most successful countries have coherent co-ordinative and 
communicative discourse. Cox (2001) gives the example where in both 
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Denmark and Netherlands change was achieved in part by social 
construction of an imperative for that change through communicative and co-
ordinative discourse. He observes that failure to do this was a factor in the 
failure to reform welfare in Germany 
 
Scarphf (2000b) argues that more substantive change requires that ideas be 
processed in a wide, communicative political discourse that enables social 
learning and attitudinal change. While Gillespie (2005) notes that 
‘glimmerings of debate are visible’ from some trade union and voluntary 
sector organisations, a more common feature of the Irish social security 
policy community is the degree to which debate happens among a narrow 
sub-group of policy actors in a tightly controlled coordinative technical 
discourse.  
 
Such discourse (often held within social partnership but also in closed expert 
groups and inter-Departmental committees) discourages ideological 
discussion by limiting policy change to ‘problem solving’ with existing policy, 
existing macro-analysis and existing resources. Groups find it difficult to 
progress issues that cannot be mediated through consensus-based change 
and controversy is often agenda managed into ‘working groups’. Irish 
discourse can be communicative but such public discourse (as in the case of 
conditionality, gender and equality) is often ‘defensive’ in nature. Various 
attempts have been made to widen social discourse into a more 
communicative style discourse, e.g. once-off Green Paper consultation 
processes or annual Social Inclusion Forums facilitated by NESF. With 
varying degrees of success, these widen participation in debate but are 
relatively structured and state-controlled spaces or processes.   
 
It is possible to identify how three stages of changes in government impact 
on Irish policy debate. The first stage, 1987–1992, was when a paradigmatic 
national political consensus was developed around a monetarist and 
increasingly neo-liberal focus on fiscal rectitude and competitiveness. This 
concept was used in communicative discourse to the nation at a time of 
social and economic crisis, with political leadership identifying a clear vision 
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of social partnership based on the NESC (1987) policy blueprint which 
became cognitively locked into a neo-liberal policy agenda based on the 
primacy of competitiveness and a low tax model of development. However, 
even in this context, a 1987 social democratic-leaning, consensus-based 
Commission on Social Welfare report enabled an alternative, more benign 
consensus to emerge about the social security policy prescription for national 
recovery. This decisive, ideational Irish social security regime pushed change 
in a qualitatively different direction than did the neo-liberal-leaning Fowler 
Report of the same period in the UK (Lister, 1988).  
 
The second stage was when strong centre-left political leadership promoted 
equality and anti-poverty policy to try, within the constraints of the existing 
cognitive lock (Blyth, 2002; Connolly, 2007), to shape a policy agenda for a 
more equal society. The agenda identified the need for new institutional 
structures that sought to overcome the limitations of Irish political culture by 
enabling new actors to engage in wider communicative discourse in bodies 
such as the NESF and NAPS and campaign for innovative, offensive 
activation policies.  
 
The third stage, dominated by a centre-right government, refers to the 
reversal back to a more neo-liberal coordinative discourse where a statistical 
and technical discourse reinforces the cognitive lock by prioritising global 
competitiveness. Not only is there little engagement with new institutional 
structures like NAPS but also attempts to dissolve alternative policy coalitions 
and prevent more communicative discourse are evident (Geogeghan and 
Powell, 2007; Harvey, 2008). Mainstream policy actors have resisted and 
actively vetoed policy agendas relating to poverty, relative income inequality, 
individualisation, childcare and the social needs of migrants. 
  
Kennelly and O'Shea (1998) note the paucity of recent social security debate 
in Ireland, while Cousins (2005), NESC (2005) and O’Connor (2005) reflect 
on how the absence of crisis in the social security system dampens initiatives 
for reform. In general social security debate is limited by a hegemonic neo-
liberal discourse and a political culture that tend towards short-term views 
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and small incremental reforms. Cousins (2005) notes the ideological 
dominance of the market and lack of realistic policy alternatives from right or 
left ideological sources.  
This section concludes that the particular Irish-style coordinative discourse is 
a key variable that maintains a narrow, problem-solving approach to policy-
making at the expense of more value-led popular discourse that might create 
social attitudinal change. Controversy is avoided by careful and ambiguous 
use of rhetorical language. When elite policy-makers control policy 
development in a highly co-ordinated and technical discourse it is more 
difficult for political actors to engage in the social learning needed to 
legitimise such change.  
6.2  Advocacy coalitions 
How do discourses interact with different institutions and political actors? This 
section uses an advocacy coalition model to bring deeper understanding to 
the interaction of the three components of the policy system described in the 
previous sections – institutions, politics and discourse (Hay, 2004b). An 
advocacy coalition framework enables a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between institutions, actors and discourse. Advocacy coalitions 
are sub-sets of groups defined by similar knowledge and interests working 
together within a policy community. Different advocacy coalitions are 
identified with different policy discourses (Sabatier, 1999; Boyle, 2005:19). 
Members of each coalition interact informally to reinforce particular policy 
arguments and to argue for particular policy changes. They draw on 
sympathetic analysis in international organisations and may sometimes work 
together formally on joint politically-oriented campaigns. Policy brokers 
mediate between competing coalitions of policy actors. Policy decisions can 
be understood as the outcomes of power struggles between these competing 
coalitions.  
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In Ireland it is possible to identify a strong, neo-liberal, competitiveness policy 
advocacy coalition and a weak, social inclusion and redistributive advocacy 
coalition, each with a distinctive policy discourse.  For illustrative purposes 
the dominant institutions and actors who debated income adequacy policy 
within a 2001 social partnership Benchmarking and Indexation Working 
Group are outlined below. These coalitions co-exist in a common Irish 
political culture, which stresses consensus and pragmatism; hence no 
advocacy coalition is likely to be extreme.  
 
 
Figure 6.1:  Advocacy coalition  
 
 
Competitiveness / Efficiency Coalition  Equity or Equality Coalition  
 
Forfás, NCC 
FÁS 
DETE 
DOF 
IBEC 
FF  
FG  
PDs  
NESC  
ESRI 
Combat Poverty 
INOU, CORI, NWCI, SVP 
DSFA 
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Labour, Greens, SF  
IFA, ICTU 
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NESF 
NESC 
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7  Conclusion and Recommendations  
The advocacy coalition approach outlined in the previous section usefully 
offers a cross-sectional view of the relationships between different actors in 
the policy community. However, it tells us little about which coalition has 
power and why or how power shifts between different coalitions. John 
(1998:168) advises charting the relationship between the institutions, ideas 
and interests and analysing this dynamic at different points of domestic and 
international economic and political cycles.   
 
Sections three, four and five already identified different social partnership,  
political and ideational cycles. These have in common a rough temporal cycle 
which can be demarcated by the years 1987–1992, 1992–1997 and 1997–
2005. Figure 7.1, Policy Coalitions and Policy Cycles (below), identifies key 
factors that combine to influence the dominant policy discourse in each cycle. 
This illustrates how both internal and external ideational debate, interests and 
institutions all were formative factors in determining social security choices. 
The relationship between the variables is circular and reinforcing. Political 
power appears a key factor differentiating the periods in question. The 
relationship between the political parties in terms of ideas sourced within the 
international political economy and different levels of commitment to 
institutionally promote communicative debate also seem to be key factors in 
determining the climate and appetite for change.    
 
Figure 7.1: Policy coalitions and policy cycles  
The following coloured circles are used to  symbolise different influences:  
 
1   Policy ideas (type of policy ideas and source of policy ideas)  
2   Institutional influence (the role of social partnership and of the civil service) 
3   Political influence (who is in political power/type of political discourse)  
4   International policy influence (key international debates)  
5   International economic influence (crisis, growth, competition) 
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Figure 7.1a  
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Figure 7.1b 
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Figure 7.1.c 
1997–2006 Competition Coalition 
 A right of centre  political dynamic in                         
a    cycle of growth in a more competitive 
international political economy. Less 
communicative discourse, policy debate more 
elitist and closed. International discourse 
dominated by Lisbon Economic agenda, NEAP 
and OECD. 
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7.1  Conclusion  
This paper has explored how Irish institutional and cultural features 
domestically constrain global economic and political pressures on social 
security policy. The peculiar features of Irish political institutions can at least 
partially explain why Irish experience has differed from other liberal regimes. 
This focus on domestic constraints to globalisation highlights how responses 
to challenges posed by globalisation have to be found in domestic institutions 
and governance (McCarthy, 2006). This is the case whether the response is 
reactively responding to fiscal pressures associated with globalisation or is 
proactively attempting to strengthen social security in anticipation of new 
risks and challenges. In either case there are strong domestic constraints on 
policy change and while this may impede negative reforms it also impedes 
positive reforms.    
 
This paper concludes with a series of recommendations to strengthen the 
Irish social security policy community and its policy capacity to respond 
positively to modern challenges. The concluding discussion is organised into 
five key themes: the political system, civil society interest group formation, 
communicative discourse, policy capacity, and the international policy 
community. Key recommendations are boxed.   
 
7.2  Political system   
Veto theorists anticipate that the more veto points the less capacity for 
radical change and the more muted the impact of globalisation. Ireland offers 
an interesting case study of a country with a liberal regime but without the 
type of majoritarian electoral system found in other liberal systems (Swank, 
2002). Irish impulses towards more liberal responses to globalisation are held 
in check by more inclusive Irish electoral and corporate institutions. The 
conventionally hypothesised globalisation dynamics (Swank, 2002:279) are 
not absent in Ireland but they are certainly muted. Irish institutions influence 
most by limiting potential policy choices. The Irish policy community is in ‘low 
level equilibrium’, experiencing a relatively ‘frozen landscape’ of social 
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security reform (Esping-Andersen, 2003).33 This is not unusual (Burton, 
2001:213), but Irish institutional vetoes, in particular the proportional 
representational electoral system, have a particularly strong limiting impact 
and directly contribute to policy inertia.  
 
While recommendations about the Irish electoral system are not in the scope 
of this short paper, attention is drawn to recommendations for reform of the 
Irish electoral system. (Laver, 1998; Barry, 2005).  
 
There is also a clear democratic deficit in the degree to which the life 
experience and priorities of end-users are reflected in the policy-making 
system. A wide range of policy tools and processes have been developed to 
enhance the likelihood of equality and anti-poverty outcomes. These include 
poverty proofing, equality proofing, budget impact assessment and gender 
mainstreaming, but they are not being used to good effect (Callan, 2004; 
Hanan, 2002, McGauran, 2005).  Danish policy-makers have a statutory 
obligation to ensure that the process of policy development and 
implementation includes consultation with end-users of policy (Van Aerschot 
2003). There are clear democratic deficits in relation to representation of 
women and other groups experiencing inequality in the social security policy 
community. Existing government policy regarding 40:60 gender quotas is 
simply ignored (O’Connor, 2008) and need to be made a statutory obligation.   
 
An active social policy envisaged in the Developmental Welfare State should 
statutorily require that 
a) policy tools are used as appropriate during key stages of the policy cycle 
b) there is appropriate consultation with end-users of policy   
c) participation quotas are set for groups underrepresented in policy process.   
 
 
7.3  Civil society interest group formation 
                                                 
33 Like the Irish weather (not too hot, not too cold and rain all the year round) the Irish social 
security policy community has a temperate personality (not too left, not too right and 
incrementalism all the year round). 
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Institutional and political struggle in relation to policy matters hugely. An 
important and ongoing site of struggle is the emerging tension over the role 
of civil society and the community and voluntary sector.34 Hardiman’s (1998) 
assessment that civil society organisations representing the poor are weak is 
worrying but is consistent with many such organisations perception of 
themselves. The transformative capacity of the sector to respond to the 
increased pressures and vulnerabilities of globalisation is limited (Acheson et 
al, 2004). The sector’s work is most influential when it works through larger 
advocacy coalitions. The opposite is also true: when the sector lobbies for 
conflicting approaches governments manipulate the ‘palpable’ differences 
between organisations as an excuse for doing nothing (Cousins, 1995a:114). 
Joint policy development work across organisations would maximise the 
sector’s power as a vested interest capable of influencing electoral outcomes 
(Coleman, 2006).  
 
A structured national campaign for welfare reform could be built through a 
permanent coalition of the up to 40 groups who have a recognised interest in 
social security reform. This could divert from a strategy of ineffective, short-
term pre-budget submissions towards more individual, personal engagement 
between lobbyists and civil servants (Acheson et al, 2004:101).  
 
7.4  Communicative discourse  
The paper concludes that the style of policy discourse of Irish institutions 
mitigates against negative reform but also fails to legitimate an agenda for 
positive reform. Irish political culture promotes a non-ideological approach to 
political debate where political decisions about redistribution are reduced to 
technical statistical debates. A value-led debate in a more communicative 
discourse is needed to change priorities at a political level and identify 
alternative policy agendas. Larragy (2006) argues that redistributive political 
                                                 
34 This space is vital as it is from here that Polanyi’s (2001) ‘double movement’ or societal 
reaction to commodification is likely to emerge. Polanyi (2001) anticipated that, following a 
‘movement’ towards commodification, society, sensing a diminution of human welfare, will 
respond in a ‘double movement’ by pressing the state to protect society from the excesses of 
market greed. Polanyi clearly differentiates civil society from the state.   
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decisions are better kept for the publicly accountable, representative political 
system. Politics can be assisted but not resolved through policy consultation 
(Davis, 1997). Ultimately more communicative and inclusive discourse needs 
to be led, not by a compromised state, but by civil society in a political 
dialogue with the state. This requires civil society to focus more of its energy 
on creating communicative discourse. Such discourse is unlikely to be heard 
from within the ‘smothering embrace’ (Broderick, 2002) of a cognitively-
locked social partnership. Where social partnership is considered to have a 
consultative role in policy-making, the appropriate forum should include a 
wide a set of people directly impacted by the policy, including service-users, 
people living in poverty, women and migrants. Other wider forms of civic 
debate such as those originally envisaged in NAPS should be promoted. 
Civil society groups need to avoid inappropriate use of the social partnership 
processes to develop social security policy that is more appropriately 
developed through public political dialogue. 
 
7.5  Policy capacity  
Reference was made earlier to the perceived weak policy-making capacity of 
Irish institutions in general and of social security institutions in particular. 
While there may be a tendency for the policy community to underrate itself, it 
is also the case that relative to other countries Irish social security is under-
researched. The DSFA ‘Aireacht’ with responsibility for policy-making is 
currently under-resourced and pressurised.35 It may be useful to revisit the 
Commission on Social Welfare (Ireland, 1986) recommendations for a 
National Social Security Agency that would be charged with developing a 
strategic overview for social security policy. Forfás, which provides good-
quality proactive analysis to the enterprise policy community, might be a 
useful model. Any such agency could make proactive use of the departments 
statutory agencies who have an underdeveloped and under-utilised policy 
                                                 
35 Within the Department opinion is mixed as to whether or not the DSFA should lead social 
security policy debate and have a clear, resourced policy role. The delivery-focused 
Department appears to have limited aspiration for a more ambitious role in policy 
development. In the context of such ambivalence, additional policy resources may not be 
used to optimum advantage.   
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role, including the Office for Social Inclusion, the Combat Poverty Agency,   
Pensions Board, Comhairle (now Citizen’s Information Board) and the Family 
Support Agency as well as the social security related functions of the Equality 
Authority and National Disability Authority.  
 
A National Social Security Agency should be established with a remit to 
develop a strategic overview for social security policy. 
 
The pro-enterprise culture of the DETE dominates the social policy function 
of that Department. There are doubts about the capacity of FÁS to gender-
proof the delivery of training and active labour market programmes and this is 
a serious obstacle to the implementation of good activation (Murphy, 2008). It 
is not clear that it is useful to retain the institutional separation of DSFA 
income supports from FÁS employment services (Boyle, 2005).  
 
More institutional co-operation is required between the DETE/FÁS and the 
DSFA. In the short term an information and systems protocol and data-
sharing strategy is required to ensure that more effective co-operation and 
outcomes are achieved between the two agencies (Indecon, 2005). In the 
longer term a fuller institutional merge may be required (Finn 2001). 
 
Non-statutory organisations also need to develop consistent social security 
expertise. Of particular importance given the stress in Ireland on corporate 
governance is the contribution both business and trade union lobbies can 
make to social security policy development. Globalisation and the national 
context of competitiveness sets the parameters for social security reform and 
directly impact on for example PRSI rate setting. McCoy (2008) makes a 
strong argument from a business perspective for aligning business with 
universal moral values and personal values. Cousins (2005) and Hardiman 
(1998) observed how Irish trade unions have less strategic interest in, and 
capacity to engage with, social security issues than their continental 
counterparts. Investment is needed by both ICTU and IBEC to develop the 
 66
Ideas, interests and institutions; explaining Irish social security policy                 Mary Murphy  
potential governance role of business and capital in relation to social security 
and transparent institutional processes are required to structure this role.    
  
A National Pay Related Social Insurance Board with social partnership 
representation would strengthen and make transparent the governance of the 
PRSI system and the respective governance roles of the social partners. 
 
The small Irish social security academic community is networking more 
coherently through the Irish Social Policy Association. A social security sub-
committee would be a useful development for this association. The DSFA 
could develop expertise by diverting some consultancy budget away from the 
major consultancy firms (including ESRI) and some work from social 
partnership institutions, moving instead towards using smaller university-
based consultancies. One outcome of this might be more diverse voices and 
a greater capacity to tackle policy monopolies.  
 
An interdisciplinary social security academic research grouping should be 
established under the Irish social sciences platform, and social security 
research should  a priority for funding under Irish Research Council for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences. 
  
7.6  International policy community  
Despite domestic constraints, global and international economic and political 
developments clearly have a significant bearing on Irish social security policy. 
Ó Cinnéide (2005) distinguishes between the prescriptive obligations and the 
indirect persuasive influence of the EU. It is likely that over the coming years 
the Open Method of Coordination will bed down more into the domestic 
policy community and process of governance. In the longer term, the OMC 
process may lead to ‘cognitive Europeanisation’, where member states adopt 
EU policy-making tools for consultation and decision-making (Sotiropoulos, 
2004:282) and this may influence future policy formation as much as direct 
regulation (Guillen and Alvarez, 2004:297). This presents potential 
opportunities for those wishing to promote a more balanced model of 
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development. Hettne (1995) highlights the role of political discourse in 
promoting hegemonic regimes. Deacon (2003) is optimistic, like Cox, that an 
alternative political economy discourse might emerge based on social 
solidarity, equity and universality. At a global and EU level networking and 
drawing from such international discourses will continue to play a role in 
framing domestic policy debate.  
 
Those seeking greater equity should continue to develop transnational and 
multi-level advocacy coalitions to promote global and EU visions of more 
equitable developmental paradigms, models and policies. 
 
7.7  Conclusion  
Globalisation presents threats and opportunities to Irish social security policy. 
However, opportunities can only be realised by breaking the path-
dependence of a conservative, cognitively-locked policy environment with a 
weak commitment to equality. The reforms outlined above have potential to 
change the electoral dynamic and improve weak policy making and 
implementation. Also needed is a shift in power. A new interest group 
formation strategy among civil society actors could generate more 
communicative discourse and enable greater use of a positive international 
ideational influence. All of this might strengthen the possibility of more 
equitable outcomes from future policy.  
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